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Chapter 8
Evaluating the Impact of Financial Planners
Cathleen D. Zick and Robert N. Mayer
Do professional financial planners improve their clients’ financial well-
being? The answer to this question is more important today than it was
twenty-five years ago, because individuals now must shoulder increasing
responsibility for their financial planning, and financial markets have
become more complicated and volatile. As evidence of these trends,
there were approximately 34 million shareholder accounts in the United
States in 1985, and investors had their choice of 1,528 mutual funds. By
2010, there were 292 million shareholder accounts and 7,581 mutual funds
(ICI, 2011).1 Given the information and choice burdens of managing one’s
financial affairs, it is not surprising that roughly one-third of households
report consulting a professional financial planner to help with saving,
investments, and insurance (SunAmerica Financial Group, 2011; Twigg,
2011; Turner and Muir, 2013). But the challenges for consumers do not
end here, because there are many different types of financial planners and
a growing variety of titles, credentials, and certifications.2
Despite the importance of knowing about the conditions under which
financial planners benefit their clients, to date only a handful of studies
have evaluated the impact of financial planners. Moreover, prior studies
are often plagued by design features that limit confidence in their conclu-
sions. In this chapter, we detail ‘best practice’ approaches that can help an
evaluator draw confident conclusions regarding whether financial planners
improve their clients’ financial well-being. We review existing literature in
light of these best practices, and we provide an example of how the choice
of evaluation design can affect a study’s conclusions using the 2007 Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF).
Evaluation designs
A good evaluation of the impact of consulting with a professional financial
planner involves insuring that three aspects of the study are sound: (a) the
measurement of advice-seeking and its consequences, (b) the applicability
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of the evaluation’s results to other settings, and (c) the confidence that
observed relationships between seeking professional guidance and finan-
cial outcomes3 are real (Langbein and Felbinger, 2006). We discuss each of
these in turn as they apply to the evaluation of professional financial
planner consultations.
Are the right concepts being measured?
At first blush, it may seem that it is simple to measure whether someone has
sought out a professional financial planner. Yet in practice, this is compli-
cated. For instance, the researcher must decide whether consultation with
an Accredited Financial Counselor or Certified Financial Planner should
count the same as a session with a bank customer service specialist. Deci-
sions must be made regarding whether to differentiate a commission-based
planner from a fee-only planner, and whether a one-time consultation
should count the same as repeated consultations. Likewise, the researcher
must make decisions about what types of time frames (e.g., one year, ten
years) should matter for planning sessions. Resolution of these conceptual
issues has practical implications regarding how contact with a professional
financial planner is to be measured.
In prior studies, researchers have often relied on a single dichotomous
self-reported question about use of financial planners, broadly defined. Yet
four studies are notable for improving on this typical approach. First,
research in Germany has relied on brokerage houses and banks to measure
use of professional financial advice (Bluethgen et al., 2008; Gerhardt and
Hackethal, 2009; Hackethal et al., 2012; Hackethal and Inderst, 2013).
Presumably these organizational records are more accurate than self-
reports. Second, one of these German studies has compared the results
of using an independent financial advisor to those from using a bank-
affiliated advisor (Hackethal et al., 2012). The results of these studies are
mixed. One concluded that financial advisors aid in diversification and
matching actual investments with the contents of a predefined, ideal port-
folio; the other study found little evidence that working with a professional
financial advisor was beneficial to clients.
A 2010 Canadian study took advantage of longitudinal data to more
precisely measure contact with a financial planner (IFIC, 2010). Specific-
ally, consumers were asked in 2005 and 2009 whether they used a financial
advisor. The empirical analysis compared those people who said yes in both
years to those who said no in both years. This procedure has the advantage
of eliminating people who had not consulted an advisor recently, as well as
those who only recently began to work with one. That study revealed that
advised households had higher investable assets in 2009 than non-advised
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households. This result held within each of five household income group-
ings, and the difference was more dramatic for households making less
than $100,000 per year compared to those earning more than this amount.
Despite the promising measurement practices of the studies just cited,
existing research still does not do justice to the wide range of financial
planners and the many factors that might differentiate their impacts on
customers. The existing literature also fails to capture the nature of the
planner–client relationship, especially its duration and the frequency of
consultations. An equally thorny issue relates to the choice of measured
outcomes. These should capture what financial planners are supposed to
accomplish, but analysts disagree on this point. For instance, Collins
(2010) distinguishes four roles that financial planners can play: technical
expert, transactional agent, counselor, and coach. Each implies different
criteria according to which the performance of a planner could be judged.
To give a flavor of the conceptual issues involved in selecting relevant
outcomes, one should ask whether the benefits of using a planner are best
measured in terms of dollars (e.g., account growth), time (e.g., time saved
in the planning process), or psychological states (e.g., retirement confi-
dence, peace of mind). Moreover, within financial results, it is unclear if a
‘good’ planner would be expected to help a person ‘beat the market,’ or
help someone avoid major mistakes (e.g., by acting as a human ‘circuit
breaker’ against behavioral biases). For example, Hackethal et al. (2012)
conclude that planners play the role of ‘babysitter,’ that is, someone who
allows competent people to use their time in other pursuits, as opposed to
‘psychiatrists’ (our term, not theirs) who provide the experience, expertise,
and perspective that a consumer lacks.
If the benefits of working with a financial planner are primarily financial
in nature, a stringent standard would be to generate higher risk-adjusted
rates of return or greater wealth in the long run. Yet most researchers do
not have the luxury of measuring exposure to financial advice at one point
in time and account balances at a much later point in time. Moreover, in
cross-sectional analyses, there is a danger of misinterpreting associations
between using a financial planner and having greater than average wealth,
since planners may help people become wealthier, but wealthier people
may also have a greater propensity to seek financial advice.
Given the difficulty of using financial results (e.g., portfolio perform-
ance) as a measure of a planner’s potential value, many studies focus on
‘process’ factors that planners can influence in the short run (e.g., taking
particular planning actions, diversifying investments, or setting aside an
emergency fund). The implicit assumption is that consistently following
the recommended financial planning process steps will improve long-term
financial outcomes. Our own research finds that the act of estimating
retirement financial needs is indeed associated with the accumulation of
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more retirement assets (Marsden et al., 2011). Yet evidence is scarce
regarding the impact on wealth of planning steps such as setting goals
and specific objectives, creating and implementing a financial plan, and
monitoring results (Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, 2009).
Partially because it is relatively easy to measure and partially because it is
under the immediate control of clients and their advisors, diversification is
the most common measure employed in studies of the impact of financial
planners. Both diversification across and within asset classes can be exam-
ined. Bluethgen et al. (2008) do a particularly good job of measuring
multiple aspects of diversification, including the use of mutual funds,
geographical diversity of equity assets (versus home bias), and portfolio
volatility.
Lacking a single conceptual way to measure the impact of financial
planners, analysts often adopt a pragmatic stance. That is, they measure
multiple outcomes, some of which cover long-term investment perform-
ance. Most studies, however, focus on short-term results or controllable
elements of the financial planning process.4
Will the results be applicable to other settings?
If the results of an evaluation are not generalizable to other settings, then
they provide only limited insights about the effectiveness of financial
planners. Two evaluation considerations are particularly relevant when
assessing the generalizability of a study’s design.
First, it is important to define the population of interest. A researcher
may want to know the effectiveness of professional financial planners with
respect to a relatively homogeneous group, such as individuals who work
for the same employer or are customers at the same financial institution.
Alternatively, a researcher may be interested in assessing the impact of
professional financial planners on the general population or targeted
subgroups (e.g., young adults, middle income households). The popula-
tion of interest drives decisions about who should be in the study and how
results can be extrapolated. For example, the findings from a study on
individuals who invested their money with financial institution X should
not be extrapolated to the population at large, as it may be that factors
(e.g., education level) that led people to invest their money in institution
X also influenced how they acted when given professional financial advice.
In practice, virtually all existing studies examining the potential effects of
financial planners use idiosyncratic samples. First, one focuses on people
who visited the website of a large financial services company (ING, 2010).
Another US-based study examines only people with employer-provided
401(k) plans (Charles Schwab, 2007). A third uses survey data in which
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all of the respondents worked for one single US employer (Marsden et al.,
2011). The most nationally representative survey relies on US data from the
RAND American Life Panel (Hung and Yoong, 2013).5 A study conducted
in the Netherlands analyzes data from a single medium-sized bank (Kra-
mer, 2012). Several German studies rely on data from a single online
brokerage company and/or a single bank (Bluethgen et al., 2008; Jansen
et al., 2008; Gerhardt and Hackethal, 2009; Hackethal et al., 2012; Hackethal
and Inderst, 2013).
Second, once the population of interest has been determined, the
researcher must decide whether data will be gathered from everyone or
from a subset of the population. Cost considerations usually lead the
evaluator to opt for a sample, but in such instances, every effort must be
made to insure that the sample selected is representative of the population
of interest. There is a well-established literature on how best to generate
appropriate samples (Scheaffer et al., 2012) and insure reasonable survey
cooperation rates (Groves and Couper, 1998). But, even if the overall
sample does reflect the larger population of interest, item-specific non-
response to questions can still create problems in representativeness, par-
ticularly in the case of potentially sensitive questions about financial
matters (Riphahn and Serfling, 2003, 2005). Imputation methods can be
used to deal with such non-response, but these are very technically sophis-
ticated (Kennickell, 1998, 2011).
Are the observed relationships credible between
professional financial consultation and the
subsequent outcomes?
Evaluations of the impact of professional financial planners should seek to
establish causality, meaning that the professional consultation led to
improved financial practices and financial outcomes. Financial practices,
such as goal setting and portfolio diversification, and financial outcomes,
such as net financial holdings, are likely influenced by a myriad factors
including economy-wide fluctuations in financial markets, individual life
cycle stage, household income, risk tolerance, and random chance, as well
as whether individuals have sought the counsel of professional financial
planners. The evaluator wants to know the effect of seeking professional
financial advice on the outcomes of interest, net of other random and
systematic elements.
Random influences can be routinely controlled by imposing standard
statistical testing techniques.6 By contrast, netting out the effects of other
systematic elements on financial outcomes is more complicated. Even
studies using large samples can yield unconvincing results if they do not
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use the proper study design. Thus, simply comparing the financial well-
being of people who use and do not use financial planners does not prove
causality. For example, several industry-sponsored studies have concluded
that professional financial planners are highly beneficial (Charles Schwab,
2007; FPA/Ameriprise, 2008; ING, 2010). One study claims (FPA/Amer-
iprise, 2008: 1): ‘Consumer confidence is near historic lows, yet one group
is feeling optimistic and on track to meet their financial goals including
retirement—people in a comprehensive financial planning relationship.’
Such simple comparisons, at a single point in time, without other controls,
are not scientifically valid.
Drawing conclusions regarding causality is best done using a sophisti-
cated evaluation design called a randomized field experiment (RFE). In an
RFE, individuals are randomly assigned to treatment and control groups.
Data on the financial variables of interest (e.g., financial plan development,
implementation, and wealth) should be gathered for members of both
groups at the outset. Then those assigned to the treatment group would
be exposed to a professional financial planner’s advice (i.e., the treat-
ment). Depending on how professional financial planning is measured,
the treatment could include a range of activities (e.g., goal setting, deter-
mination of risk tolerance, account diversification recommendations),
dissemination modes (e.g., face to face, online), and one or several expos-
ures. After an appropriate lapse of time (e.g., six months, one year, five
years), data on the financial variables of interest would be remeasured and
the change in the financial variables for the treatment group would be
compared to the change for the control group. Statistically significant
differences in the treatment group’s financial outcomes when compared
to the control group would be evidence of the impact of professional
financial planning. Figure 8.1 depicts the structure of a well-designed RFE.7
Comparison of the treatment group’s outcomes to those of a control
group insures that the evaluator can net out systematic factors affecting
both groups. For example, historical events like the 2008 Great Recession
should affect both groups equally. Likewise, if the study involves a signifi-
cant follow-up period, the comparison to a control group insures that life
stage changes in financial outcomes are netted out. For instance, by com-
paring the changes in the treatment group to those experienced by the
control group, the evaluator would net out any changes in financial out-
comes that are attributable to some households moving in to the empty
nest stage when resources may be redirected from child-related expend-
itures toward investments. Finally, the inclusion of a control group
surveyed twice insures that the evaluator can net out any effects of sensitiz-
ing participants to the purpose of the study. That is, if participants become
aware of the importance of financial planning as a result of the baseline
data collection, this can be netted out from the analysis by comparing
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changes in the treatment group’s financial outcomes to the changes in the
control group’s financial outcomes.
Random assignment to the treatment and control groups insures that
when comparisons across the two groups are made that the evaluator will
not have results that are confounded by the possibility of more motivated
or more capable individuals self-selecting into the group that receives
professional financial planning. Nor will the evaluator have to adjust for
the possibility that one group contains more high- or low-income individ-
uals that could affect financial comparisons.
For these reasons, RFEs are the ‘gold standard’ for assessing the causal
relationship between an intervention such as meeting with a professional
financial planner and one or more outcomes. Yet since these are typically
very expensive to implement and require extensive planning, they are
rarely carried out in practice. Instead, study designs most often used to
assess how professional financial planners affect financial well-being
involve some sort of non-experimental research design.
Non-experiments take one of two approaches. One approach simply
compares the outcome variables of interest for a single group of individuals
before and after the exposure to the treatment. In such a setting, individ-
uals serve as their own controls. For instance, financial wealth levels prior
to meeting with a professional financial planner might be compared to
Randomly
assign 
individuals
Time 1 financial
well-being
data gathered 
for both groups
Treatment
Group
Control
group
Time 2 financial
well-being
data gathered
for both groups
Financial planner
exposure for treatment
group only
Time
Figure 8.1 Randomized field experiment to assess the impact of consulting a pro-
fessional financial planner
Source: Authors’ analysis, adapted from Langbein and Felbinger (2006).
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peoples’ financial wealth one year later. A handful of studies to date
incorporate such a before-and-after comparison, including a study by Ger-
hardt and Hackethal (2009), who analyze almost 600 German investors
who had previously directed their own accounts but recently consulted an
advisor. The researchers reported that switching to working with an adviser
triggered higher trading activity, most likely as part of restructuring port-
folios. Newly advised clients also increased their diversification and
engaged in less risky trading.
Another analysis by Bhattacharya et al. (2012) found some minor bene-
fits in terms of account diversification and performance from consulting a
professional financial advisor, but in that study, subjects were a very idio-
syncratic group. The authors examined the less than 5 percent of people
who responded affirmatively to an opportunity to work with an advisor. As a
result, these subjects represent a strongly self-selected group. Even then,
most advised clients failed to follow the recommendations of the bank-
provided advisors. Horn et al. (2009) also used the passage of time to
compare advised and non-advised investors before and after a change in
the tax laws relevant to investing. They noted that advised investors were
less likely to fall victim to the new rules, but the authors could not rule out
the possibility that people who were less prone to making tax errors were
also more likely to choose to work with a financial planner.
A second non-experimental approach dominates existing research.
Here, outcomes of interest are measured at a single point in time for two
different sets of individuals, where one group has been exposed to the
treatment, while the other has not. In our context, this might involve using
cross-sectional survey data in which all respondents report on their finan-
cial wealth, but some respondents indicate that they have met with a
financial planner while others say they did not.
Both non-experimental approaches make use of comparisons with con-
trol groups, but the absence of random assignment calls into question
whether the two groups are similar on all relevant dimensions except for
the treatment. As a result, analysts cannot rely on simple comparisons of
means. Rather, researchers must control for variables that capture other
systematic processes unrelated to the treatment that may affect the out-
comes of interest. For instance, in the case of financial outcomes, these
might include measures of education, household structure, and life cycle
stage (to name a few). Omission of these potentially important covariates
can lead to biased estimates of the causal relationship between professional
financial planning and financial outcomes.
The absence of random assignment in non-experimental evaluations
also creates concern about possible reverse causation, which could arise if
people who seek professional financial planning do so because they have
greater financial wealth initially. Alternatively, people with low levels of
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assets (or who experienced a recent drop) might seek professional help as a
means of offsetting their past decisions. In either situation, uncertainty
about the causal direction of the relationship between exposure to profes-
sional financial planning and financial outcomes leads to concerns about
whether the estimate of the treatment effect on the outcome of interest
may be biased.
Also, in the non-experimental evaluation design, confidence regarding
estimated causal relationships requires the elimination of omitted variables
and reverse causality bias. In essence, the evaluator must attempt to com-
pensate for non-random assignment through the use of statistical model-
ing. When evaluating the impact of professional financial planning,
confidence that the estimated relationship is truly causal is a function of
two things: (a) the inclusion of covariates in the model that adequately
capture the influence of other variables affecting financial well-being, and
(b) the statistical allowance for the simultaneous relationship between
seeking professional planning and financial well-being. A pioneering
study in this field by Bluethgen et al. (2008) uses multiple regression
analysis to examine the association between using a bank-based financial
advisor and financial account characteristics. The authors control for a
variety of individual attributes, including the investor’s age, income, and
risk attitude. The authors report that using an advisor appears to promote
not only greater account diversification and closer adherence to prede-
fined model portfolios but also higher expenses. Nevertheless, this study
did not control for possible reverse causation.
An important methodological step forward was taken by Hackethal et al.
(2012), who employed an instrumental variable approach to predict use of
a financial advisor. First, they used regional-level data to approximate the
geographic concentration of financial information, which they viewed as a
substitute for the use of a professional financial planner. They then used
the predicted likelihood of using an advisor in an analysis of various
investor practices and portfolio outcomes. The authors uncovered little
evidence that use of a financial professional was beneficial to clients.
Hung and Yoong (2013) set out to replicate the instrumental variable
approach, but they elected to use two measures of financial literacy to help
control for possible reverse causation between investor outcomes and use
of an advisor. Their logic was that financial literacy could be a substitute or
complement for advice and thus influenced the likelihood of seeking it.
Therefore, to the extent that financial literacy helps drive the decision of
whether to seek advice, controlling for literacy would help separate the
impact of advice from the likelihood of seeking it. Hung and Yoong
analyzed a variety of investment account features (account contributions
and withdrawals, asset allocations, and variable investment ‘mistakes’).
They concluded that advice had little apparent influence. If anything,
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they found evidence of reverse causation, namely, that people who experi-
enced declines in their account balances turned to advisors.
Research by Gerhardt and Hackethal (2009) exemplifies an alternative
to the instrumental variables when identifying the influence of advisors on
their clients. Rather than controlling on predicted use of financial advisors,
these authors use a propensity score approach by which they statistically
construct pairs of research subjects matched according to all observable
characteristics except their reported use of a financial advisor. This proced-
ure approximates random assignment in a true experimental design and
thereby makes it less plausible that differences in investor outcomes are a
function of anything other than use or non-use of professional advice,
including differences in wealth. Using this approach, they found little
evidence that professional advisors promoted better investment practices
and outcomes for their clients.
A US-based study of employees of a large state university also used a
propensity score approach, with mixed results (Marsden et al., 2011).
Working with an advisor was linked to several important financial planning
activities, including goal setting, calculation of retirement needs, retire-
ment account diversification, use of supplemental retirement accounts,
accumulation of emergency funds, positive behavioral responses to the
recent economic crisis, and retirement confidence. Use of a financial
advisor was not related, though, to self-reported retirement savings or
short-term growth in retirement account asset values.
Two studies that most closely approximate the ideals of an RFE are a
study by Kramer (2012) in the Netherlands, and a study by Hung and
Yoong (2013) in the United States. The Dutch study is notable for its use
of both cross-time and cross-group comparisons. Thus, Kramer compared
the portfolios of previously self-directed investors after switching to being
advised. Because this switch is relatively rare in real-world settings, the
author analyzed only 228 investors during a four-year period (2003–7).
Within a month of consulting an advisor, client portfolios not only evi-
denced extensive turnover in existing assets but investors also added capital
to their accounts. To put these account changes into meaningful perspec-
tive, the author employed a matched-pair research design based on pro-
pensity scores. A final nicety of this study is the separation of the sample
into larger and smaller investors, to account for the possibility that advisors
put more effort into larger portfolios. In addition, the short-term effect of
working with an advisor was an increase in account diversification, espe-
cially a rise in the use of stock mutual funds within the equity portion of the
accounts. The author also compared the portfolio returns of early and
late switchers over the 2003–7 period, finding that the accounts of
early switchers performed slightly worse than late switchers. This result is
apparently due to shifts from equities to bonds rather than differential
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performance of equity accounts. Despite the use of comparisons across
time and investor group, this study did not account for the possibility of
self-selection, namely, that people who switched from being self-directed to
working with an advisor may have had characteristics that also influenced
the outcome variables of interest.
Hung and Yoong’s analysis (2013) is the only one to date to employ
random assignment of subjects. Unfortunately for our purposes, that study
examined the impact of printed advice rather than interaction with
advisers, and people allocated funds to hypothetical portfolios, not actual
accounts. People were assigned to three groups: participants in the control
group received information on fund expenses and past returns only, and
the default treatment group automatically received advice on their alloca-
tion choices. This advice was based on a model of optimal portfolio alloca-
tion and was provided as (a) information only or (b) information plus
feedback on chosen allocations. Finally, participants in the affirmative
decision treatment group chose whether to receive investment advice.
(There were also low and high return variations.) In a nutshell, the results
for the default advice group approximated those of the control group, but
the choices of people who deliberately chose advice were superior.
Members of the latter group were less likely to make two serious investment
mistakes: under-diversification and investing too conservatively. While
random assignment should account for the possible effects of other par-
ticipant characteristics, the authors reported that the findings were robust
to multiple regressions that include experimental group membership
along with a variety of covariate measures, including financial literacy.
In summary, recent scholarship has employed a variety of methodo-
logical techniques to explore the impact of professional financial planners
on clients. The best models reduce the likelihood that observed connec-
tions are due to unmeasured variables or reverse causation. Absent a
randomized experimental design, the use of propensity scores may be the
best available method. To date, studies using propensity scores have been
confined to investors with a relationship to a single bank, brokerage, or
employer. In addition, these research subjects have tended to be wealthier
than their respective national populations. Our use of propensity scoring
below extends this line of research to a national sample, including individ-
uals who fall below a country’s median income level.
Analyzing a national dataset
Measuring how much professional financial planners improve their clients’
financial well-being is facilitated using data from the 2007 Survey of Con-
sumer Finances (SCF), to demonstrate how evaluator choices can influence
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conclusions drawn from an evaluation. The SCF is a triennial survey spon-
sored by the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve and conducted
by the National Opinion Research Center. It utilizes a dual-frame sample
design with one frame focused on securing a sample that is representative of
all US households while the other frame seeks to secure a sample of wealthy
US households. In the 2007 SCF, there were 2,915 households in the former
category, and 1,507 in the latter category (Kennickell, 2009).8
Measuring concepts in the SCF
National surveys like the SCF have the advantage of including questions
that have been tested for both measurement validity and reliability. Never-
theless, a researcher using the SCFmay not always find that questions asked
reflect all dimensions of the underlying concept that he would like to
measure. Such is the case with regard to the measurement of professional
financial planning, since the SCF includes a single question regarding
information sources used when making savings and investment decisions.
The SCF question reads as follows:
What sources of information do you (and your family) use to make decisions about
saving and investments? Do you call around, read newspapers, magazines, material
you get in the mail, use information from television, radio, the Internet or adver-
tisements? Do you get advice from a friend, relative, lawyer, accountant, banker,
broker, or financial planner? Or do you do something else?
Respondents can givemultiple answers to the above questions. Here we code
respondents who included ‘financial planner’ among their sources of infor-
mation as consulting a professional financial planner. These households are
used as our treatment group, while those who did not list ‘financial planner’
among their sources of information constitute the control group.
The SCF contains a great deal of detail regarding household financial
holdings, allowing us several choices for how we measure financial out-
comes. Here we select three: total household financial wealth, the propor-
tion of all financial assets in equities, and diversification of financial assets
as measured by the number of asset categories with positive balances that a
household has. These three measures reflect elements of both financial
plan implementation and outcomes, though they only implicitly measure
the steps taken in developing a financial plan.
Generalizing to a population
In the analyses below, we focus on households with working-age adults in
the bottom 99 percent of the income distribution. To this end, we restrict
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the SCF sample to households where the head (defined as males in married
couple households by SCF convention) is between the ages of 18 and 64.
We also eliminate households with annual incomes of $425,000 or more, as
this is the approximate threshold for the top 1 percent that year (Luhby,
2011). To illustrate how the choice of target populations can affect conclu-
sions drawn from an evaluation study, we divide the sample by median
household income in 2007 and re-estimate our models for each subgroup.
As noted earlier, survey respondents are sometimes hesitant to answer
what they perceive to be sensitive financial questions, so SCF staffers have
developed imputation algorithms to deal with missing values. Imputations
are generated five separate times for each missing value and stored in five
replicates for each record. The replicates not only provide greater preci-
sion for the estimation of missing values, but their use also requires that
researchers use programming macros to compute correct standard errors
(Kennickell, 2009). To keep our analyses manageable, we follow the sim-
pler strategy of undertaking separate estimation for each of the five impli-
cate datasets (Hogarth et al., 2004). Our results do not differ markedly
across the five implicate datasets, so we present estimates for dataset three
here.9
Insuring that observed relationships are credible
In what follows, we review three sets of estimates for the relationship
between consulting a financial planner and our outcomes of interest,
using the SCF. Bivariate estimates, presented first, do neither control for
the influence of socio-demographic and economic factors that might affect
the three financial outcomes of interest, nor do they allow for potential
simultaneity of financial outcomes and seeking counsel from a professional
financial planner. Second, we report ordinary least squares estimates that
remove the systematic influence of socio-demographic and economic
factors. Last, we report propensity score estimates that net out the socio-
demographic and economic influences and also adjust for the potential
simultaneity.
Descriptive information for the three outcome measures appears in
Table 8.1, separately for households that do consult professional financial
planners and those who do not. Here all observed mean differences are
statistically significant (p < 0.05): households that consult professional
financial planners hold significantly more financial wealth, have a larger
fraction of their wealth in stock equity, and have greater diversification of
assets when compared to those households that do not consult professional
financial planners. This holds both for the full SCF sample, and for the
two income-stratified subsamples. In other words, using only bivariate
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 14/9/2013, SPi
Evaluating the Impact of Financial Planners 165
comparisons, it appears that professional financial planners do help house-
holds adopt sound financial planning principles and create more financial
wealth.
The conclusion above must be tempered by the recognition that other
systematic processes affect the decisions households might make regarding
stock equity, portfolio diversification, and ultimately, financial wealth accu-
mulation. For example, individuals who are more highly educated are
more likely to understand the importance of asset diversification. Likewise,
those who have minor children in the home may find it more challenging
to build financial wealth because of the need to spend income on child-
related goods and services. To capture the impact of consulting with a
professional financial planner while also simultaneously accounting for
these other socio-demographic and economic processes that affect a house-
hold’s financial interests, we utilize multivariate (OLS) regressions (inde-
pendent variables are defined in Appendix Table 8.A1).
Tables 8.2–8.4 report our multivariate OLS estimates for the three out-
comes of interest, for both the full sample and the income-stratified sub-
samples. Several features of these results relative to the bivariate results are
worth noting. Strikingly, the estimated impact of consulting with a profes-
sional financial planner declines by more than 50 percent for each of the
three outcomes. In the case of the full sample, for example, the estimate of
a financial planner’s contribution to total financial wealth falls from $138,934
(bivariate) to $66,182 (OLS), controlling for the socio-demographic and
Table 8.1 Weighted means and t-tests for financial outcome variables
Full sample
(N = 2,881)
<Median income
(N = 1,350)
Median income
(N = 1,531)
Consults
planner
(N = 696)
Does not
consult
planner
(N = 2,185)
Consults
planner
(N = 178)
Does not
consult
planner
(N = 1,172)
Consults
planner
(N = 518)
Does not
consult
planner
(N = 1,013)
Total financial
wealth ($)
228,123 89,189 79,145 23,746 302,286 178,626
t-test 7.86** 2.84** 4.55**
Proportion in
equity (0–1.0)
0.35 0.21 0.24 0.12 0.41 0.33
t-test 10.44** 5.69** 4.62**
Number of asset
categories (1–8)
2.86 2.00 2.22 1.50 3.18 2.70
t-test 15.22** 8.84** 7.38**
Note: **p < 0.05.
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances.
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economic factors hypothesized to affect financial wealth. Correspondingly,
the stock equity effect falls from 14 to 6 percent, while the diversification
effect falls from 86 to 39 percent.
Comparisons across the income-stratified subsamples also reveal sizable
differences in the estimated financial planner effects. In the case of total
financial wealth, the estimates indicate that consulting a financial planner
appears to boost higher-income households’ financial wealth by $76,739,
while such consultation has a smaller effect on lower-income households’
financial wealth, raising it by $39,488 holding other factors constant.
Financial planner consultation appears to have a larger marginal effect
on the fraction of wealth held in stock equity for lower-income households
(7 percent) compared to higher-income households (4 percent). Likewise,
Table 8.A1 Weighted means for ordinary least squares regression covariates
Variable
name
Definition Full
sample
<Median
income
Median
income
Age Age of the household head measured in
years (head defined by SCF to be the
husband in married couple households)
43.03 41.21 45.04
Education Head’s education measured by years of
formal schooling (head defined by SCF
to be the husband in married couple
households)
13.50 12.63 14.46
Female Interviews are done with the person in the
household who self-identifies as the most
knowledgeable about financial matters
(1 = female, 0 = male)
0.54 0.58 0.50
Marital
status
1 = Household head is currently married,
0 = otherwise
0.61 0.42 0.81
Number of
children
Number of minor children in the home 1.01 0.97 1.06
Non-
Hispanic
Black
1 = Non-Hispanic Black household head,
0 = otherwise
0.14 0.19 0.09
Hispanic 1 = Hispanic household head, 0 = otherwise 0.11 0.14 0.07
Wage
income
Annual wage income measured in $10,000s 5.34 2.18 8.83
DC pension
plan
1 = Head and/or spouse have a DC pension
plan with current employer(s), 0 = otherwise
0.42 0.23 0.62
DB pension
plan
1 = Head and/or spouse have a DB pension
plan with current employer(s), 0 = otherwise
0.22 0.13 0.32
DC and DB
pension
plan
1 = Head and spouse have both DC and DB
pension plans with current employer(s),
0 = otherwise
0.11 0.03 0.20
Source : Authors’ calculations from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finance.
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the marginal diversification effects are larger for lower-income house-
holds (43 percent) than higher-income households (32 percent). Thus,
the OLS models provide a more nuanced picture of professional finan-
cial planners’ impacts compared to the bivariate results. While still
statistically significant, the planner effects are more modest for all
three outcomes and the effects also vary markedly by income group.
These findings illustrate the importance of controlling for other factors
Table 8.2 Ordinary least squares parameter estimates of total financial wealtha
Independent variables Full sample <Median income Median income
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Consults financial planner 66,182.00 39,488.00 76,739.00
(3.88**) (1.99**) (3.01**)
Ageb 6,385.75 1,927.39 11,561.00
(10.53**) (3.31**) (9.80**)
Age-squaredb 243.44 42.83 359.69
(4.64**) (0.90) (3.15**)
Education 17,676.00 6,207.86 35,708.00
(5.71**) (2.12**) (5.96**)
Female 39,569.00 10,725.00 46,341.00
(2.85**) (0.77) (1.95)
Marital Status 3,468.22 12,196.00 28,962.00
(0.22) (0.81) (0.92)
Number of children 5,722.47 1,402.57 6,209.15
(0.91) (0.24) (0.54)
Non-Hispanic Blackc 39,352.00 17,310.00 98,753.00
(1.97) (0.99) (2.38**)
Hispanicc 4,305.89 11,112.00 12,559.00
(0.19) (0.53) (0.28)
Wage income ($10,000s) 190.71 28.22 172.97
(11.75**) (0.60) (7.73**)
DC pension plan 8,600.09 22,238.00 10,173.00
(0.50) (1.23) (0.34)
DB pension plan 60,088.00 12,093.00 96,691.00
(2.53**) (0.51) (2.32**)
DC and DB pension plan 12,344.00 20,118.00 20,132.00
(0.37) (0.42) (0.39)
Adjusted-R2 0.15 0.02 0.16
F-statistic 39.55** 2.61** 23.24
a Regressions use SCF final weights.
b Age centered on the mean age of the household heads so as to avoid multicollinearity
between age and age-squared (Glantz and Slinker, 1990).
c The omitted racial/ethnic category in this sequence of dummy variables is households where
the head is non-Black and non-Hispanic.
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. **p < 0.05.
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances.
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that may influence financial outcomes, and also the relevance of focus-
ing on the target population when selecting a sample for empirical
work.
As noted above, OLS models do not incorporate a correction for reverse
causation. Yet, the possibility exists, for example, that those with more
financial wealth may be more motivated to seek professional advice in
order to protect that wealth. In our data, statistical tests for reverse
Table 8.3 Ordinary least squares parameter estimates of proportion stock equitya
Independent variables Full sample <Median income Median income
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Consults financial planner 0.06 0.07 0.04
(4.69**) (3.53**) (2.76**)
Ageb 0.00 0.00 0.00
(5.09**) (4.06**) (3.19**)
Age-squaredb 0.00 0.00 0.00
(2.53**) (0.11) (3.17**)
Education 0.02 0.01 0.02
(6.82**) (3.44**) (4.28**)
Female 0.04 0.01 0.06
(3.56**) (0.82) (4.12**)
Marital status 0.00 0.00 0.03
(0.06) (0.21) (1.40)
Number of children 0.01 0.01 0.01
(2.64**) (2.29**) (1.77)
Non-Hispanic Blackc 0.07 0.08 0.05
(5.06**) (4.43**) (2.03**)
Hispanicc 0.06 0.06 0.06
(3.30**) (2.69**) (2.20**)
Wage income ($10,000s) 0.01 0.01 0.00
(5.90**) (2.19**) (3.09**)
DC pension plan 0.19 0.21 0.14
(15.09**) (11.71**) (7.64**)
DB pension plan 0.00 0.02 0.01
(0.17) (0.67) (0.28)
DC and DB pension plan 0.01 0.09 0.01
(0.27) (1.97) (0.16)
Adjusted-R2 0.27 0.22 0.14
F-statistic 81.43** 30.15** 20.02**
a Regressions use SCF final weights.
b Age centered on the mean age of the household heads so as to avoid multicollinearity
between age and age-squared (Glantz and Slinker, 1990).
c The omitted racial/ethnic category in this sequence of dummy variables is households where
the head is non-Black and non-Hispanic.
Notes : t-statistics in parentheses. **p < 0.05.
Source : Authors’ calculations from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances.
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causation (Baum et al., 2003) suggest that it exists.10 Here we correct for
this problem using a propensity score approach because, unlike structural
equation modeling, the propensity score approach is not limited by the
functional form that is chosen. It is also appealing because individuals in
the treated sample who have no counterfactual in the control sample are
dropped (Black and Smith, 2004; Gibson-Davis and Foster, 2006).11
Table 8.4 Ordinary least squares parameter estimates of the number of asset
categoriesa
Independent variables Full sample <Median income Median income
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Consults financial planner 0.39 0.43 0.32
(8.34**) (6.27**) (5.26**)
Ageb 0.02 0.02 0.02
(12.42**) (8.81**) (7.54**)
Age-squaredb 0.00 0.00 0.00
(4.44**) (4.46**) (3.21**)
Education 0.12 0.09 0.11
(14.33**) (9.05**) (7.86**)
Female 0.04 0.02 0.10
(1.00) (0.45) (1.79)
Marital status 0.10 0.03 0.11
(2.41**) (0.57) (1.51)
Number of children 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.34) (0.35) (0.58)
Non-Hispanic Blackc 0.33 0.37 0.12
(6.15**) (6.20**) (1.25)
Hispanicc 0.31 0.34 0.28
(4.87**) (4.68**) (2.58**)
Wage income ($10,000s) 0.04 0.07 0.02
(9.87**) (4.24**) (4.53**)
DC pension plan 0.80 0.91 0.53
(17.26**) (14.53**) (7.52**)
DB pension plan 0.16 0.08 0.07
(2.46**) (0.93) (0.65)
DC and DB pension plan 0.20 0.06 0.12
(2.25**) (0.37) (0.95)
Adjusted-R2 0.42 0.38 0.20
F-statistic 164.92 63.54** 30.84**
a Regressions use SCF final weights.
b Age centered on the mean age of the household heads so as to avoid multicollinearity
between age and age-squared (Glantz and Slinker, 1990).
c The omitted racial/ethnic category in this sequence of dummy variables is households where
the head is non-Black and non-Hispanic.
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. **p < 0.05.
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances.
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In what follows, we develop a propensity score that adjusts for the bias
caused by reverse causation by creating matches between members of the
treatment and control groups rather than through a random assignment
process used in true experiments (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 1984). We
first estimate a logistic regression in which the dependent variable indicates
whether the respondent consults with a financial planner. Independent
variables in this equation include all factors that might affect the decision
to meet with a financial planner, as well as those factors that might affect
the substantive outcomes of interest (i.e., total financial wealth, proportion
in stock equity, and diversification of assets). We use responses to attitu-
dinal questions regarding financial risk, financial luck, spending, and
retirement confidence as indicators of factors that affect only the likeli-
hood of meeting with a financial planner. We also include the standard
socio-demographic and economic variables described above as factors that
could influence both the likelihood of consulting a financial planner and
our substantive outcomes of interest. Using the first stage logit estimates
(results presented in Appendix Table 8.A2), we generate predicted prob-
abilities of meeting with a financial planner. These then are used to match
treatment households to controls.12
Figure 8.2 compares the outcome of interest—the estimated incremental
effect of consulting a financial planner on total financial wealth—across all
three estimation approaches. Here we show that the bivariate model sug-
gests that consultation with a professional financial planner is associated with
significantly more financial wealth (for the full sample as well as both the
lower- and higher-income subsamples). Adjusted for socio-demographic and
economic characteristics, the OLS estimate of the net effect of consulting a
professional financial planner is reduced. After using the propensity
score adjustment, the impact of the professional financial planner on
financial wealth becomes statistically insignificant (for the full and the
two subsamples).
Turning to the proportion of total financial wealth held in stocks,
Figure 8.3 again shows that simple bivariate comparisons provide the larg-
est estimate of financial planner effects. Controlling for socio-demographic
and economic covariates reduces the effect size. And adjusting for simul-
taneity reduces estimated effects even further (for both the full and the
lower-income subsamples). Interestingly, now we see that consultation with
a professional financial planner leads to a significantly higher equity pro-
portion for lower-income households, but it has no significant effect for
higher-income households.
Finally, Figure 8.4 shows how the estimates differ when the outcome of
interest is the number of different financial assets held. Again, in all cases,
the bivariate estimates of consulting a professional financial planner are
largest, followed by the OLS estimates, and the propensity score estimates
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are smallest. But, unlike the above, now we find that consulting a profes-
sional financial planner produces greater diversification.
Conclusion
This chapter describes how different methodologies can alter the esti-
mated impact of financial professionals on advice recipients. We now
know with reasonable certainty that simply comparing people who do
and do not use professional financial advice paints an overly rosy picture
of the benefits of working with a financial planner. More careful research
that addresses self-selection, other confounding variables, and reverse
causation shows smaller benefits of working with a financial planner. More-
over, the main effect is to enhance account diversification, as shown by our
SCF analyses.
Yet knowledge of the impact of professional financial advice remains in
its infancy, and future research can profitably proceed in three directions.
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Figure 8.2 Estimated incremental effect of consulting a financial planner on total
financial wealth
Note : n.s. = not statistically significant at p < 0.05.
Source : Authors’ calculations from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (Kennickell, 2009).
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First, to date no study has carefully distinguished different types of financial
professionals, even though they vary enormously in expertise, access to
investment products, and financial incentives. Some studies lump all
types of financial planners into a single category, while others examine a
single type of advisor employed by a single financial institution. Much
remains to be learned about the impact of different types of financial
professionals.
Second, structural equations and propensity score approaches are useful
steps in learning more about the effects of professional financial advice,
but these methods are no substitute for an RFE. Though these are expen-
sive to conduct, RFEs eliminate the possibility of self-selection and reverse
causation. Moreover, randomized experiments can recruit people who,
under real-world conditions, would rarely elect to consult a financial plan-
ner but who might gain the most from professional advice—people with
below-average incomes and/or in the early stages of their work life.
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Figure 8.3 Estimated incremental effect of consulting a financial planner on pro-
portion of total financial wealth held in stocks
Note: n.s. = not statistically significant at p < 0.05.
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (Kennickell, 2009).
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Third, in the future, we need studies of longer duration than those
currently available. It is not surprising that the short-term effect of consulting
a financial planner is to diversify a person’s portfolio or rebalance it toward a
particular risk profile. In light of the short-term and often ongoing financial
costs of working with a financial professional, some may not find this com-
pelling evidence of the value of professional advice. Results showing that
advised investors feel more confident about their financial futures than do-it-
yourself investors (as comforting as such findings may be to existing clients)
are also unlikely to move people toward employing financial professionals. It
would be more useful to demonstrate that working with an advisor or
planner boosts long-term rates of return and levels of asset accumulation.
Given short-term fluctuations in financial markets, what we need is evidence
on account performance over the medium- or long-term, to allow planners
and researchers alike to drop the word ‘potential’ in the phrase: ‘potential
benefits of professional financial advice.’
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
0.16
Full Sample < Median Income > Median Income
n.s.
Bivariate OLS Propensity Score
Figure 8.4 Estimated incremental effect of consulting a financial planner on the
number of different types of financial assets held
Note: n.s. = not statistically significant at p < 0.05.
Source: Authors’ calculations from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (Kennickell, 2009).
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Endnotes
1. The growth in investor numbers and options has been fueled, in part, by the
dramatic shift from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) pension
plans over the same time period. In 1985, 38 percent of Americans whose
employer provided a pension plan were in a DB plan only, 35 percent were in
a combination DB/DC plan, and 29 percent were in a DC 401(k) plan only. By
2008, those percentages had shifted to 7, 26, and 67 percent, respectively (EBRI,
2010: figure 2).
2. The Certified Financial Planning Board lists twenty-three different financial
services credential designations (see http://www.cfp.net/learn/knowledge-
base.asp?id=15).
3. Throughout this chapter we use the term ‘financial outcomes’ as a summary
term for financial practices and wealth-related results that may be linked to
seeking the counsel of a professional financial planner.
4. Once conceptual decisions about advising exposure and key outcomes are made,
the next step is to insure that these measures are operationalized in ways that
have little random measurement error. That is, the evaluator must insure that
the data sources used (e.g., survey questions or administrative records) have
minimal measurement error. Such measurement error may be particularly prob-
lematic in the case of surveys containing potentially complicated and/or sensi-
tive financial questions. Fortunately, there is a literature that details the best
practices for asking financial questions in a way that minimizes measurement
reliability concerns (Avery et al., 1988; Juster and Smith, 1997; Kennickell and
Starr-McCluer, 1997; Duncan and Petersen, 2001; Hurd et al., 2003).
5. Although the RAND American Life Panel survey is conducted via the Internet,
the Panel has special arrangements to facilitate the participation of people with
limited Internet access.
6. The influence of random elements can lead to erroneous conclusions in two
ways. First, chance variation can lead to the conclusion that a professional
financial planner had an impact on a financial outcome when s/he actually
did not. The risk of making this error (i.e., Type I error) can be minimized by
setting a low alpha level (i.e., <0.05) for statistical significance which will vary by
sample size. Second, chance variation can lead to the conclusion that profes-
sional finance counsel had no impact on a financial outcome when it actually did
(i.e., Type II error). The likelihood of making this second type of error is a
function of the size of the sample, the magnitude of the effect size in the
population associated with having sought professional financial counsel, and
the type of statistical test used. Generally speaking, larger samples, larger effect
sizes, and multivariate statistical tests all reduce the likelihood of making this
second type of error.
7. In theory, RFEs should have four groups to control for measurement effects. In
practice, this is very rarely done.
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8. Sample weights are used when presenting descriptive statistics for the 2007 SCF
because of the unusual sample design and to correct for systematic refusals to
participate in the SCF. The decision to weight multivariate analyses is the
subject of some debate in the literature (Lindamood et al., 2007); in the current
chapter, no weights were used.
9. Other sets of estimates are available from the authors on request.
10. The test involves estimating the reduced form equation in which financial
planner consultation is the dependent variable. The residuals from this
equation are then included as an additional regressor in the structural
equations estimating each of the three financial outcomes. The resulting
Durbin-Wu-Hausman F-statistic generated from this second equation is a
measure of endogeneity. For the current application, that F-statistic is 5.88
(p = 0.02) for total financial wealth, 15.37 (p < 0.00) for stock equity, and
42.85 (p < 0.00) for asset diversification, suggesting that there is ample
evidence that consulting a financial planner and each of the three outcomes
of interest are endogenous.
11. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1984) proposed the use of the propensity score
method to address simultaneity problems by balancing members of a so-called
treatment group (i.e., individuals who consult a financial planner) with specific
members of a so-called control group (i.e., individuals who have NOT met with
a financial planner) with regard to their covariates.
12. Several matching methods have been used in the literature (see Gibson-Davis
and Foster, 2006). Given that there is no consensus on the best matching
method, we use a radius caliper matching technique that makes use of all
members of the control group within a 0.01 radius of the treatment observa-
tion. After the matching, t-tests are conducted to ascertain if statistically signifi-
cant differences exist between the treatments and the controls.
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